

**THE IMPACT OF POPULISM REGIME OF PRESIDENT
DUTERTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE
DEMOCRACY: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY OF
NETIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES**

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Populism is radically changing the global political landscape. Scholars debate whether it is a style, doctrine, a political strategy, and a marketing scheme. Thus, populism seems to become stronger and more intellectuals criticize it. But the term “populism” used to have more precise meaning (Rose, 2016). Historically, populism has come in left and right-wing variants. In 19th century political movements the term populism was first used to specifically describe a certain interest group (Mudde & Mudde, 2018). The first was the United State People’s Party in the 1890s that was also known for its agrarian movement (De Cleen, Glynos, & Mondon, 2018). The motives of the movement were customized to oppose the championed skepticism of railways and demonetization, banks and political elites (Klingemann, 2004). They implemented the moniker “Populist” from the Latin “populus” which means the people and to get rid of the plutocrats, the aristocrats and all the other rats, and install the people in power was their mean objective. The second movement involved the term populism was the Russian Narodnichestvo in 1860’s and 1870s (T. Friedman, 2003). Accordingly, a movement of intellectuals and revolutionary students who value rural peasants and strongly believed that in order to overturn the tsarist rule they need to form a revolutionary movement. As a result, a belief was established that power be in the right place with agrarian workers rather than with the urban elite (Mudde & Mudde, 2018).

In 1950s, populism came into broader used because it became involved to phenomena as diverse as political movements associated with charismatic leaders in Latin America such as Juan Peron in Argentina or Getulio Vargas in Brazil, McCarthyism in the US, and military coups in Africa championing social revolution known as Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (Mény & Surel, 2009). As follows, populism captured the public attention almost everywhere. However, as with any “ism”, definitions are crucial. Cass Mudde (2018) define populism as an “thin ideology” that separates society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” and claim that politics should be an expression of “the general will of the people”. It means a


dissimilar thing to different groups, but all variety share a suspicion of and hostility toward elites, established institutions and mainstream of politics. Hence, populism perceived itself as speaking for the forgotten “ordinary” person and claim itself as the voice of genuine patriotism. The only solution to decades of disastrous rule by elites is an impudent blend of popular will (Mudde & Mudde, 2018).

The concept of populism is so difficult to pin down because it follows other “isms” like communism, liberalism, nationalism or socialism usually assert themselves as communist, liberalist, nationalist or socialist (Klingemann, 2004). Hence, populist by contrast rarely call themselves populist. Along these lines, almost always scholars, journalist and other actors unlike the movements themselves who label incidents as populist (Hellmann, 2017). Thus, most of the time political opponents thrown the label rather than used to delicately compare and understand political movements. In line with that, populism as “thick ideologies” for example communism have a visualize for how politics, the economy and society should be ordered, in which populism does not. For instance, populism adheres overturning the political establishment but insufficient in a solution to replace for it (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017a). So, Cass Mudde (2018) compare populism with pluralism which acknowledge the legitimacy of many different groups in the society. In this manner, populism lacks a specific view on how politics, society and the economy should be organized, it can be merged with a form of different ideologies and policies comprising both right- and left-wing variants (Webb & Curato, 2018).

Common as the term “populism” has become, populism itself is an abstract concept. The strategy of the politicians who seek popularity by appealing to the electorates feelings was most of the time populism was depicted (T. Friedman, 2003). The true populist movements share some common fundamental element known as an appeal to the excluded. Thus, populist claim represents a neglected majority by challenging the underserving but powerful minority (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). As follows, despite casting themselves as tribunes of the people, populist leaders are actually likely to come from the elite as they are to appear from the lower classes. Through the support of the masses they seek legitimacy, and populist favor top-down control (Mudde & Mudde, 2018). They established mass movements to increase their personal power, and

for some not to truly change the system (Teehanke, 2016). In this way, populist must hold together heterogeneous political combination, and to this end, the economic policies redistributionist often employed. The populist creates new social programs, upgrade up spending, and take control of the parts of the economy (Ernst et al., 2017a). As a result of some populist movement make up a short-term economic boom better for their follower, but for some result government largess, inflation rate, debts build, business scale back operation, and economic crises arises (Rose, 2016).

Contemporary populism is primarily associated with the radical right. The most prominent examples of contemporary populist in media articles and academic are radical right parties like Jorg Haider's FPO, Jean-Marie Le Pen's FN or Pauline Hanson's One Nation (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). Thus, increasingly, non-radical right parties are also included in the classification of 'right-wing populism', most remarkably Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia or Pim Fortuny's LPF. On the other hand, populism can also be found on the radical left (T. Friedman, 2003). One of the most well-known left-wing populists in post-war Europe is the French former businessman Bernard Tapie who had scandal-ridden political career in both Socialist Party and the outsider Radical Party mainstream (Kriesi, 2013). Hence, left-wing populism is commonly strongest among outsider parties, such as the East German Party of Democratic Socialism, the Scottish Socialist Party or the Dutch Socialist Party (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). Consequently, left-wing populist parties combine a democratic socialist ideology with a strong populist discourse. They present themselves as the vox populi also known as the "voice of the people" (K. Hawkins, Read, & Pauwels, 2017). Furthermore, Figure 1 shows a proportion of (vertical axis) leaders still in office after a certain number of years in office (horizontal axis). The blue line corresponds the proportion of populist leaders surviving, while the grey line corresponds non-populist. As figure 1 denotes, the possibility of a populist remaining in office is consistently greater than the possibility that a non-populist remains in office.



Source: Kyle, J., & Mounk, Y. (2018). The Populist Harm to Democracy : An Empirical Assessment, 40. Retrieved from <https://institute.global/sites/default/files/articles/The-Populist-Harm-to-Democracy-An-Empirical-Assessment.pdf>

However, many commentators and academician are sounding alarmed about the rising populism as a threat to the stability of liberal democracies . Considering the assortment forms of populism as the multifaceted expressions of political pathology (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). According to Taguieff,

In the ordinary language of today, populism makes the ideas of demophily and demagogy coexist. This means that ‘populism’, in its constitutive ambiguity, can be considered an ideological corruption of democracy if we consider that democracy, founded upon transmissible principles, implies, in Proudhon’s words, the willingness to teach and educate the people rather than to seduce it. (Taguieff, 1997)

This, definition of populism suggests being able to measure its deterioration by reference to an accepted standard. Thus, pathology is meaningful only by affinity with a situation defined as normal and the case is least problematic (K. A. Hawkins, 2009). As a matter of fact, democracy is not only a system of fundamental values, but also a procedural mechanism, identified as ‘the rules of the game’. Any mention to pathology

will inevitably include the definition of democracy and this depends upon from one political setting to another (Mudde, 2004).

Thus, Taggart (2000) argue that to analyze populism as pathology, representative politics is no longer acquired the contradiction between populism and democracy, but rather that between the representative democracy as usual form of democracy and populism. Along these lines, Margaret Canova (1999) suggest from the reference to the people is the common feature which unites all those who claim to be, democratic. Even though 'the people' is the usual denominator, and the role and place of the people in any political system is highly belligerent (Roberts, 2007). Because today even the dictatorial regimes pretend to rule in the name of the people. As a result, populism cannot be designate as anti-democratic (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014). On the other hand, one may wonder why populism is seemingly negatively given this proximity and affinity with democratic principle. The answer is simple, in which populism, as with any other concept, is an empty shell which can be occupied and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it (Hellmann, 2017).

Furthermore, political scientist, journalist and even many politicians are more anxious about the stability of liberal democracy. Hence, on the literature of 'crisis of democracy', back in many decades the liberty and self-determination were threaten by the midst of a democratic recession (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017) . As a result, the world in real time witnessing what it looks like to go through a process of decay or decomposition in a stable democracy and might even challenge by a threat of a rise of another kind of fascism. Thus, for the past 12 years, more countries have shift away from liberal democracy (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Populist newcomers across the west have taken great power and populist in many countries have gained power such as Hungary and Turkey that inflicting serious damage on the institution of democracies. In a lot of striking contemporary evidence, the rise of authoritarian populism poses an especial and modernistic challenge to stability of liberal democracy (Gurov & Zankina, 2013).

Moreover, explicit or implicit sets of theories bestowed on empirical assumption, populism can either be a feature or a bug of ongoing democratic resilience or democratic decay (Ernst et al., 2017a). Because some people believed that democracy is in crisis which populist government often lead to lasting and significant democratic institution

deterioration. On the other hand, some believe that populism present a big opportunity to deepen democracy and has a positive impact on the political system by establishing a new opportunity for political participation (Mudde & Mudde, 2018). In addition, others perceive populism on contrary, as a sign of democratic pliability, limit the excessive power of elites, providing an essential corrective that will help address popular protest and make political systems more democratic (Ernst et al., 2017a).

In recent years, from the left and right the voters increasingly choses a populist leader. In countries with long democratic traditions and history an increasing number of elected populist leaders can be found. Some claim that the cause of this rise is the lack of inclusive growth and failure of globalization (Postill, 2018). In which, part of the population has not benefited from the economy and understandably, a skepticism that makes populist style appealing. While populism is widespread through North America and Europe, it is also making advances in Southeast Asia (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). The populist in Southeast Asia is different in many ways from North America and Europe. They give emphasis less on immigration and trade. Thus, Southeast Asian populist concentrate on ethnic divides and spurring religious, opposing to drug trafficking, specifically methamphetamines and appealing to the working and lower-middle classes (Webb & Curato, 2018).

The research tended to focus on the case of the Philippines, a manifestation of populism can be attributed to democratic deficit and a weak institution. The inadequacy of democratic institutions to address public demands. The reason for the deficit is direct to the predominance personalities over institutionalized political parties. In this manner, the paradox is that deficits in democracy produces an opportunity for populist to further strengthens the tendency for personalities over parties (Mény & Surel, 2009). Thus, institutions might further weaken under a populist regime. According to some political scientist, this will include electoral integrity. However, the circumstances that populist succeed to win the election means that electoral integrity was defected to begin with (T. Friedman, 2003).

The Philippines in Asia is one of the oldest democracies with a long election experience and democratic institution formation. It is tempting to say that the Philippines is a copycat of US as a former colonial state of it. But that might not me suitable

description of the challenges of democracy of both countries are facing (McCoy, 2017). The Philippines in any cases, had Marcos dictatorship for twenty years. Whereas, many compare Rodrigo Duterte to Donald Trump in the way they use unfiltered language, their unpredictable attitude towards democratic institutions and their having a solid base of support. In some aspect it might be accurate that Philippines mirror US. And this would not be too surprising given the colonial legacies that last but also brought pervasive and unintended consequences (Teehankee, 2016). Thus, the democratic deficit suffered by the Philippines can be traced to the enduring effects of the elite and political structures that began since the colonial state apparatus (Mény & Surel, 2009).

Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's dirty mouth and deadly war on drugs is showing global media attention (Thompson, 2016). But there is something about a populist leadership style of Duterte that blow Philippine politics because of his trends. Duterte-style of populism cut across classes, genders, generations and the political spectrum that resulted to contradictions and conflicts in the society (Curato, 2017). For many, Duterte matches the sort of a typical Asian strongman. He is a harsh talking leader with barely regards for liberal rights. He disregards foreign intervention and recognize criticism against his administration as personal attack (Webb & Curato, 2018). Furthermore, the Philippines is once again headed toward the return of the "national boss rule", after the thirty years of bloodless revolution that exiled the dictator Ferdinand Marcos (Curato, 2019).

In spite of the criticism overseas, Duterte remains popular in the Philippines and registered to more than 80% popularity rating for almost 2 years into his presidency (Pulse Asia 2018). In addition, Duterte started to national fame by turning Davao in the southern island of Mindanao, formerly a source of communist insurgency and crime into a disciplines and progressive city that has attracted many investments (Curato, 2017). But this alteration derived with a heavy price, as the mayor has gained the reputation through using tedious-handed strategies and extrajudicial killings to fight criminality, most especially the drug trafficking and narcotics (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). Thus, after some initial uncertainty, Duterte jumped into the presidential race with one basic campaign description. Through any means possible including declaring martial law and extrajudicial killing, he will restore peace and order in the Philippines (Curato, 2019).

Along with these lines, in 1988 when Duterte was first elected as mayor, Davao citizens entered into a Hobbesian social contract with Duterte, which permitted him to rule with an iron-fist in exchange for personal security and social peace (Webb & Curato, 2018). Currently, elected as the president it remains to be think about as to whether the entire Filipino nation will be doing the same with Duterte.

With this in mind, this research aims to explore Duterte's presidency as populist manifestation itself in social media. Since mass media observe norms and news value, social media perform as direct linkage to the people and give opportunities to the populist in order to avoid journalistic gatekeepers (Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017). In this means, social media offer the populist with the freedom to openly articulate their ideology and spread their messages. In line with that, the emerging hybrid media system, political actors acquainted with offline and online platforms to gain a fundamental advantage in party politics. Thus, social media propose political actors another channel to endorse themselves and personally, actively, and directly communicate with their electorate and offer politicians with unmediated and inexpensive access to voters (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017b; Gerbaudo, 2018). Moreover, this research aim to employ a quantitative content analysis as manifestation of itself in social media of typical Facebook post.

Furthermore, this research will also be centered towards Duterte's brand of populism in policies. Thus, the researcher believe that these policies have a high degree of incoherence and inconsistency in Duterte's brand of populism namely: Presidents vocal stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policy and the tax reform program of the government. Additionally, to analyze and discover the perception of the netizen towards the selected policies, a topic modelling using R studio will be employed. Moreover, the gathered data will assess the agreement and disagreement comments of the netizens towards Duterte's policies. On the other hand, besides exploring social media as a public stage for populist actors, the paper also inspired by Wolfgang Merkel (2004) embedded and defective democracy. Thus, democracy is generally regarded of as 'electoral democracy'. Consequently, relying on the Freedom House data as a preferred source of data about democratization around the world and easily accessible data on the

Internet. Furthermore, it attempts to evaluate the quality of democracy under the administration of President Duterte.

1.2 Research Objectives

To fully grasp the Duterte phenomenon is a necessary starting point for understanding the recent strain of populism and situate the administration with the discussion on the challenge towards the quality of Philippine democracy. Among the most recent and bold attempt is the publication of the Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Duterte's Presidency by Nicole Curato (2017). Thus, an inclusive discussion of the research on the topic is warranted and timely, bearing in mind the role of populist politics in contemporary democracies. Hence, it is useful to reassess the literature on populist politics not only because of the primacy of the term in recent social sciences research but also because populism does leave an impression on important political phenomena.

With this in mind, this research aims to investigate the Duterte's populist regime manifestation through the use of social media. Moreover, this research shall also investigate Duterte policies and evaluate the quality of Philippine democracy. By analyzing the populist regime of President Duterte on the development of Philippine democracy, through the application of primary and secondary source of data, this research seeks to answer the following questions:

- 1) To what extent does President Duterte's populism manifest itself in social media?
- 2) To what extent does President Duterte policies express as regards the claim to populism?
- 3) To what extent do the populist practices of President Duterte affects the quality of democracy?

1.3 Significance of the Study

This research aims to contribute to the recent efforts to construct a broader framework for analyzing populism, one that closely deliberate variations across time and place and is concentrating to both the vibrant and stable features of populist politics. The purpose of this research served as a newly opened ground for the study of Philippine populism and its relationship with the quality of democracy. Duterte's political disruption towards the status quo signified in the multiplicity of labels. Thus, his policies, actions

and values conveyed to the public performances, weakened the compass of the Philippine political entity and exposed institutionalized values like basic human rights to public attacks. Moreover, this study consists of several threads and intersections between reviewed publications analyzing Duterte's populist regime and his impact on Philippine democracy. Consequently, investigate how Duterte use social media for populist purposes on the aspect of political communication and style as strategies.

In addition, research on populist has been growing in recent years, mostly in political science, but also in sociology. Along these lines, this research aim suggests directions for future studies, with a focus on the analysis of populism as form of political claims that can be measured through the aspect of social media. The findings of this study will manifest the primacy of the democratic process. Furthermore, researcher on populism, social media and democracy can use this study to further explore populism not just in the grounds of social media and how it affects the quality of democracy but throughout the development process.

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study

This, research is narrow in terms of its scope and methodology. First, the populist regime of President Duterte as a manifestation itself in social media will be analyzed through his political communication and political style visible to Facebook posts. Second, President Duterte's policies as an expression on the claim of populism will be evaluated based on his political strategy and performing crisis. Thus, these policies will limit only to the high degree of incoherence and inconsistency in Duterte's brand of populism namely: Presidents vocal stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policy and the tax reform program of the government. A related post towards the three main polices will be evaluated through netizens post in Twitter. Third, measuring the quality of democracy this research will utilize the embedded and defective democracies by Wolfgang Merkel (2004) and also will incorporate the Freedom House democracy data from start of President Duterte's regime 2016 up into the present.

With this in mind, future researches may concentrate these limitations and explore new method in analyzing the influence of populism ideology in the Philippines.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Populism in contemporary politics and academia constitute one of the most intensely debated topics. There are few political theorists that pay attention to populism. Because some scholars fears in politics have considered populism as a pathological symptom of some social disease (Canovan, 2004). But for that reason, typical political theorists find it worth to take an interest in populism (Mudde, 2004). Thus, this chapter discusses literature that are relevant to the current research. The chapter covers local, regional, national and international studies that present different logical ideas of President Duterte Populism Regime a Contemporary Challenge to Philippine Democracy.

2.1 POPULISM AND DEMOCRACY

In the modern democratic politics of populism can be considered as a necessary component of democracy (Canovan, 2004; Kaltwasser, 2013). Populism is based on the opposition between the redemptive (i.e. the ideals of popular power, and political redistribution) and pragmatic (i.e. institutional and the issue of governance) factors of liberal democracy (Canovan, 2004). Arditì (2004, 2007) argued that there are three ways modern democracies accompanies and haunt by the populism specter. First, populism is a critique of liberal political representation because of the aspect of democracy into the need of a strong leaders. Because of that it condense the activist, spontaneous and radical quality of democracy. Second, populism provides varieties of participation in response to political elitism. Third, it is a threat of democratic institutions and incumbent elites because it attacks the structure of liberal politics by producing strong and undemocratic leaders (Arditi, 2003).

Among populism scholars research, one of the crucial area is the concern of populism consequences of the phenomenon in democratic governance. The main perception of populism became toxic for democracy (Saguin, n.d.). For example, European Union President Herman Van Rompuy declared populism “the biggest danger of Europe” when there were a number of parties in European Union members rise to xenophobic right-wing parties (Kaltwasser, 2013; Mudde, 2007). Bartolini (2011) argued that populism is a “virus that infects party system across Europe and spread its epidemic

effects. In spite of that overwhelming negative view in Europe about populism some scholars claim that the support of populism inclusionary politics grow to the marginalized sector of democratic participation towards the case of left-wing populism in Latin America (Wejnert, 2014). Because of that increasing indefinite arguments some lead into interesting inquiry to whether populism brought corrective to democracy or a threat (Kaltwasser, 2013; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2007).

Thus, the influence of populist politics towards the quality of democracy stresses that populism rebalancing strategy of political power distribution and established occurring social groups (Wejnert, 2014). In line with that, relation between representatives institution and the will of the people build a tension between liberal democracy and populism ideologies (Wejnert, 2014). Because for populist the primary task of political institutions are to serve as a machinery for delivering majority of political decision and not just to function as check and balances system (Leland & Read, 2013).

Both populism and democracy integrate a scope of goal. For democracy, the goal is best shown by theoretical investigation and pragmatic proposals that concentrated on several issues to principle of democracy (Wejnert, 2014). The democratic government responsiveness to its citizen is one of the democracy's prerequisites and definitions (Dahl, 2013). Because of that goal, the main focus of democracy are development and sustainability of democratic governance (Tilly, n.d.). With broad inclusion of the citizen in the governing process as well as participatory citizenry and civil society development (Stone, 2002). According to a certain inquiry the goal of democracy centered on the concept of importance of trust, rule of law (Kaltwasser, 2013; Tilly, n.d.) and relation to the democratic system in which the main objective of a democratic state where social justice desired by modern societies ((Walsh, Lasky, Morrish, & Chaiyajit, 2012). While the goals of populism are manifestation of the opposition in populism description of either ideological strategy or spontaneous action (Gurov & Zankina, 2013).

The struggle against the powerful elites is one of the goal of spontaneous actions in populism. These aim is to control unfair treatment of policy, disenfranchisement of regular citizens, control financial and economic giants, powerful cartel and potent bosses (Wejnert, 2014). Furthermore, populism is often attributed with the improvement of democratic platforms and processes for the expression of the unrepresented or

marginalized. That form of populism are known to be as a grass root of democracy (Wejnert, 2014). For example a political leadership of a Russian intellectuals who glamorized the hard work of the peasants known to be the “narodniki” an agrarian reform movement (Arditi, 2003). This was established for the ruling elite to learn from the Russian peasantry (Canovan, 2004). And lastly, concerning to the relation of populism and democracy. Unintentionally populism contributes to democratic processes through elections, agendas of political parties, and political platforms (Arditi, 2003; Cotkin & Lasch, 2006; Wejnert, 2014). It affects and intermingles with democracy and plays variety of political roles (Wejnert, 2014).

2.2 PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY

The two Greek words; demos meaning people and kratos meaning to rule in which the word of democracy originated from. Therefore, the word means “popular sovereignty” and sometimes called “rule by the people”(Christiano, 2018). The ancient Greeks specifically the city state of Athens the concept of democracy was originated in the fifth century B.C (Touraine & Macey, 2018). Periclean Athens, the well-known leader, has motivated generations of common people, statesmen and political theorist. However in the contemporary era, many attributes of Athenian democracy appear unfamiliar and bizarre (Diamond, 2012). The Assembly composed of 5,000 to 6,000 members was the central political institution in Athens open to all ` citizens except slaves, women and foreigners (Klein, 2011). Through majority vote, Assembly could decide without legal restraint any domestic issue (Studies, 2004).

In countries like South Asia, what the people fancy about the democracy are the aspect of community rights and equality; in Western Europe people valued rule of law and political freedom (Beetham, Carvalho, Landman, & Weir, 2008). The democratic ideal empowered ordinary people by providing guaranteed basic freedom and equality, to resolve disputes through peaceful agreement, bring restoration of social, political and respect differences (Rustow, 2006). The heart of an ideal democracy is the rule by popularly elected representatives but between people, regions and nations it may also has overlying meanings (Diamond, 2013). There is no perfect democracy because democratic

ideals are easier in principle than in practice. Various aspects of countries political and social life are more or less democratic (Beetham et al., 2008).

The key democratic principles are *popular control* and *political equality* (Rustow, 2006). These two principles express democrats struggled to equal exercise of citizenship rights, formulate popular control over public decision making, to overcome difficulties such as language, class, wealth, gender, religion, ethnicity and to remove elite monopoly over decision making (Beetham et al., 2008). In an association or small groups *popular control* and *political equality* guaranteed everyone efficient equal right to vote on rules and policies and right to speak in person (Christiano, 2018). While in the level of a whole society in a larger associations useful attention of time and space taken by the representatives on behalf of the rest needs collective decisions. Democracy for most people then is attained in the first case of control over the decisions makers act in their place not direct popular control over public decision making (Coppedge, Alvarez, & Maldonado, 2008). However the key criteria for determining how democratic a system of government representative are how efficient is that control, individual citizens, different groups and their numbers are distributed equally (Cunningham, 2002).

The first principle concerns what is being distributed (political control over authoritative political decision-making) while the second principle concerns how it should be distributed (equally) and implemented (impartially) (Skaaning, 2019).

According to Beetham (1999) and International IDEA (Beetham et al., 2008) the underlying Global State Democracy Indices Methodology conceptual framework was derived from the two core principles of democracy the popular control and political equality. However, popular control does not mean that all individuals have uniform influence over authoritative political decision making. On the other hand political equality alone does not mean also that there is any popular control over decision making in a society (Skaaning, 2019). This means that both principles are both required and complement each other. Thus, popular control and political equity are combined sufficient principles of democracy and mandatory (Beetham et al., 2008). Yet, important

question arises if whether two principles combined are efficient to take the democratic ideal. Since political liberty or freedom is not mentioned as one of the principle (Sabl, 2015). However the answer is important because without respect to fundamental freedoms such as civil and political liberties popular control and political equality are not possible (Lemos & Gould, 2006).

2.3 POPULISM AS A THIN-IDEOLOGY

The populism originates particularly on the issues conflicting between the popular identity and popular sovereignty (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). The concept of ‘people’ and popular sovereignty to go over popular/elite opposition plays an important element of a diverse interpretation of the politics (Stanley, 2008a). In the history populism manifested in the founding of republics to mass revolution as the ways of taking back sovereignty by the excluded people (Rose, 2016). Thus, the literature on populism as an object of scientific and philosophical study is afflicted with epistemological and ontological issues (Canovan, 2004; Laclau, 2005). This is intensified more by its relationship with political movements, system (e.g. authoritarian, democracy) and ideologies (e.g. liberalism, socialism) (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). Consequently, in line with this research, this section focuses on the dimension of populism starting with its conceptualization as an ideology.

The ideology is defined as a system of concepts for understanding the social world and standard of actions (Freeden, 1998). It proposed an analyses to represent the rationality, development and substance of idea rather than a form of false consciousness (Freeden, 2003). The populism as an ideology Canovan (2002) argued that the key concept of this ideology is the people followed by sovereignty, democracy, and majority rule. Moreover, populism describe democracy as a government by sovereign people and not for government representatives and institution (Canovan, 2004; Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). Thus, democracy demand popular control over political decisions because the concept of sovereignty denotes mere popular elections and consultancy (Canovan, 2004). The focus of studies in European right-wing populist parties by Cass Mudde series brought most influential definition of the ideology of populism:

Populism is a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups,

“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people” (Mudde, 2004, 2007)

People/elite antagonism is the focus approach of populism as a “thin ideology”, but it still considered populism as a belief system even though “thin” still depends upon the actions of political agents (De Cleen et al., 2018). According to Mudde (2004) examined populist ideology laid through theoretical foundation of objectivity. As basis of perspective discourse, he provide definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology consisting of the following matters: (1), a Manichean picture of politics that pitted the people against an elite; (2) an importance on the virtue of people; and (3) an expression of politics as a general will of the people. Moreover, a populist ideology mandate the formation of the people as empowered actors in the policy process (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). Thus, the thin centered ideologies cannot resolve all major questions in socio-political because the thin ideologies itself possibly be compatible to socialism or liberalism a developed political beliefs (Stanley, 2008a). Mudde (2007) argues that populism has the ability to combined with either right or left wing appeals, and can be found in any types of ideological cleavages; which these aspect of ideology connect with populism depend towards the actions of a political actors that organize the socio-political context (Kaltwasser, 2013; Mudde, 2007).

Cass Mudde’s approach to populism had been influential in political science research, especially among those who focus on European populist right-wing parties (K. A. Hawkins, 2010; Kaltwasser, 2013; Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2011; Routledge & Paredes, 2006; Stanley, 2008a). One of the example is the adaptation of Pankowski’s (2010) of Mudde’s definition of populism into analysis of Polish populism. According to Pankowski, (2010) with the help of ideologies as a “mental frameworks” the political actors will be able to interpret political reality and political actions. In line with that, he also stresses the value of cultural resources in a given population and more generally “the traditions that legitimize political actions”. According to Pankowski (2010) that towards the “culture of the ordinaries” the populist has been successful in building connection. In addition, Pankowski brings analysis of populism as an ideology of the role of traditional formation of nation build foundation for populist mobilization (Pankowski, 2010)

Defining populism as thin ideology has an implications for the way in which research focus is carried out. The Philippine President Duterte fits the definition whether we view populism as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004) a political logic (Laclau, 2005), or a performance style (Moffitt, 2017). Because he expresses an articulation of nationalism as a thin ideology. Duterte segregate the “virtuous people” versus the “dangerous other” that deploys a political logic. Furthermore, responsive to the demands of a mediatized public sphere as a political style (Webb & Curato, 2019). Comparable with contemporary populist, Duterte is an expert at hacking attention of people (Pertierra, 2017). The top terms among the mind of the citizens that are asked to describe President Duterte were brave/tough/rude/aggressive and the phrase like “he keep his promises” (Webb & Curato, 2019). Duterte built a narrative virtuous citizens getting end of the failures of justice system (Curato, 2017). Thus, the enemy of this narrative within the nation are the well greedy and tone deaf elites of Imperial Manila, dangerous drug pushers, corrupt justice system and those who turn blind eye to the drug plague (Curato, 2019).

Therefore, I suppose that populism should be considered as a distinct ideology because it express a specific way of interpreting politics in an explicit interaction of its fundamental concepts. Moreover, I rely that populism has proven a distinct pattern of ideas simply because of its evidence that it belong to the category of word a product of linguistic practice of the suffix ‘-ism’ that signify an intention of a distinct pattern of thinking. Thus, I acknowledge the thin nature of populism that is unable to stand alone as a practical ideology and need to be found in a combination with “full” ideologies. In line with, I assume that there’s an advantage of the conceptual thinness of populism that makes it a sympathetic partner for full ideologies. Because populist leader and populist movement have a freedom to choose a diverse ideological comrade. In which, populism as a thin ideology are free to borrow and possess in selecting their ideological partner, whether socialism, nationalism, communism and other full develop ideologies.

2.4 POPULISM REPRESENTING ‘THE PEOPLE’ AND THE ANTI-ELITE

The conceptual core of populism as a distinct ideology is like nationalism, focuses on the 'who' politics (Pappas, 2016). According to Ordoñez & Borja (2018) populism ideology devoted in recognizing the people as the honored actors of politics and modifying the peoples position that consist of four diverse but interrelated concepts:

- The existence of 'the people' and 'the elite' as a two homogeneous component
- The relationship of the people and the elite.
- Popular sovereignty idea.
- Positive value of 'people' and denigration of elite.

There are three core meanings of people whose notion is deeply indefinite (De Cleen et al., 2018). First, it refers to the sovereign people, ordinary people, the people as masses, the people as demos, the people as nation or ethnos, and to the culturally or ethnically distinct people (Brubaker, 2017). Second, it express in the name of the "little people" against the "wealthy people" that simply imply redistribution of politics. Also, express in the name of the sovereign people against ruling elites that imply re-democratization of politics (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). Third, express in the name of a bounded and distinct people against the hostile group that imply a politics of ethnic or cultural nationalism (Brubaker, 2017). Furthermore, "the people" are describe as an opponent to political, economic and cultural elites (Stavrakakis, 2014). "The people" are characterized as morally decent (though not necessarily pure), hard-working, plain spoken, family oriented, economically struggling, bestowed with common sense (Brubaker, 2017). On the other side, referring to the "elites" are branded as the powerful, rich, the well-connected, the educated and recognized empowered. In line with that, the "elites" are seen often corrupt, take part in different rules, self-serving, living in a special worlds, untouchable with the concern and problems of the ordinary people and superior towards their own ways of life, habit and value (Cotkin & Lasch, 2006). The elites can also include immigrants, refugees, racial or religious minorities and criminals.

The core elements of populism are the claim of representing the will of the people and the anti-elitism (M., 2014). The populist variety in criticism of elites frame an assumption that the principle of popular will is homogeneous and that the elite as a whole does not represent the will of the people (Krämer, 2017). Enthusiast of populism are not inevitably in support of direct democracy (Demir & Ilgaz, 2007; Diamond, 2012; Sabl,

2015; Stavrakakis, 2014; Walker, 1964) but they may have confidence for referendums as redemptive acts to get rid of the problem of the elite and punish those in power (Canovan, 2004). Moreover, having a charisma cannot be considered a likely characteristic of a leader, predominantly in both followers and populist leader the effective impression of a good leader is capable of perceiving the will of the people and forcefully implementing it (Krämer, 2017).

In addition Kasuka's (2017) work on moral ethics presents a framework in politics that explicitly divides groups into good and evil. A moral division of the Philippines extreme socioeconomic inequality (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). This inequality produces two public spheres both having distinct values. First, the middle class who value education, meritocracy, rule of law, anti-corruption, and comprising of English speaking elite (Kusaka, 2018). Second, is the mass circle comprising the lower classes living in slums, streets and value gentle populist and pro-poor policies (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018). This laid the foundation for acknowledging populism beyond the typical mass populism such as middle-class and counter-elite populism (DeVilles, 2016). For instance, the case of Duterte highlighting that his bandit plot a segment of both mass sphere and civic. In which, Duterte split up the mass sphere between a moral poor and the stubborn poor drug users (Kusaka, 2018). Thus, he also achieved the support of the new middle class and elite frustrated with the dominant liberals (Ordoñez & Borja, 2018)

For that reason, most of the threads of populism literature center on the concepts of the people and popular sovereignty. Thus, it plays the role of people and elite antagonism that forms a key element of populism as a distinct ideology. However, I argue that before populism assumes the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, the element of "crisis" is enacted and recognized first by a populist actor or movement. Moreover, the notion of crisis builds the foundation of populism as a cliché of doing social and political practice to summon political work. In which "recognizing crisis" is the central part of populist politics that serves as a bid for attention, an appeal that extraordinary times requires extraordinary measures and a pointer of urgency. Therefore, crisis is a perfect storm towards the public knowledge that was promoted by the convergence of media, commerce, social media, fake news and other new communication technologies. As a result, populist actors or movements upon recognizing crisis build the

idea of people versus elites antagonism in the society and establish an emerging division in the community.

2.5 Embedded and Defective Democracies

The worldwide striking advancement of democracy has seen in the twentieth century. In western Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece) in the mid-1970s and continued in the 1980s in Latin America, commenced the ‘third wave’ of democratization with the fall of the rightist dictatorship (Merkel W., 2004). It is without comparison in the history, it extended east Asia, diminish over communist regimes of Soviet Union and eastern Europe and even felt a few African countries. Thus, the third wave of democracy from the long-term perspective has given a more continuing political heritage for the twenty-first century compared to all numerous types and ideologies of totalitarian rule. Therefore, the twentieth century most especially in the last quarter is known to be the ‘century of democracy’. This remarkable wave of democracy was leaving no doubt at the first glance based on the Freedom House and of the Bertelsman Transformation Index (BTI) (Merkel, 2012).


According to Wolfgang Merkel (2012), Freedom House project successfully plot a story in the specter of the third wave of democracy. The essayists, journalist, publicist and political scientist all over the world preferred Freedom House as a source of data about democratization by providing in the Internet, comprehensible access of data on countries world-wide and democratic development timelines of each country over the last three decades. Thus, the Freedom House minimum requirements for the state to be listed as democratic is that of so-called electoral democracy. The basis for the successful statistics. Based on Wolfgang Merkel study this term, is both from theoretical and normative perspective. Moreover, the electoral democracy involves the election of ruling elite be in accordance to the formal, universal right to vote, as such that election are free, general and regular (Merkel W., 2004).

Therefore, the democracy is generally perceived as ‘electoral democracy’. Along with measuring the quality of Philippine democracy I consider adapting the model of embedded and defective democracy of Wolfgang Merkel (2004). In line with that, beginning with the root of embedded democracies, which consist of five interdependent

partial regimes (electoral regimes, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, effective power to govern) and four subtypes of defective democracy, exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy and tutelary democracy were explain as follow.

2.5.1 The Notion of Embedded Democracy

The stable constitutional democracies are embedded in two ways based on the notion of embedded democracy. First, internal the specific interdependence/independence of the different partial regimes of democracy. Second, the external in which the partial regimes are embedded in spheres of democratic condition that secure from outer and inner influences shown in Figure.



Source: Merkel W. (2004). Embedded and Defective Democracies. *Democratization*, 11(5), 33–58.

2.5.1.1 Partial Regimes of Democracy

The embedded, liberal democracy comprises of five partial regimes: democratic electoral regimes, political rights participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability and the guarantee effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives (Merkel W., 2004). According to Wolfgang Merkel (2004), these five

partial regimes illustrate a concept of democracy that goes beyond the definitions proposed by Huntington, Downs, Robert Dahl's and Przeworski. Thus, the concept of 'realistic', is based exclusively on the institutional structure of democracy and does not support outcomes of outputs as describing the constitutional characteristic of democracy. Moreover, based on the Wolfgang Merkel arguments the efficient democracy has to go further a basic democratic electoralism in view of that fact other partial regimes guarantee not only procedural aspects but also objective behind democratic fulfilled election (Merkel, 2012). Furthermore, a meaningful democratic election, not only to have a fair democratic selection of the elite but also to have institutional guarantee that elected representative rule by constitutional and democratic principles. For that reason, the term electoral democracy evolves to be too narrow from both logical and normative perspective (Merkel & Croissant, 2004).

2.5.1.2 Electoral Regime

In democracy, it functions as making access to public power positions of the state reliant on the results of open, competitive elections. The central position among the five partial regimes is the electoral regime of embedded democracy, because it has the most obvious expression of the participation of the citizens, sovereignty of the people and equal weight allotted for the individual inclination (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). Furthermore, pluralistic competition and open central power positions is the unique difference between autocracy and democracy (Merkel W., 2004). Thus, the minimal requirements for a democratic electoral regime are the equal political rights (regular, free, general, equal and fair elections). According to Robert Dahl, a democratic electoral regime has four supplementary elements: active suffrage, universal, passive right to vote, free and fair elections and elected representative. Thus, election is the sanctioning mechanism that used as processes of vertical accountability.

2.5.1.3 Political Rights

The political right completes the democracy vertical dimension and make the public arena an independent political sphere of action, in which organizational and communicative power are foster (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). The determination and support of competition over positions power are based in the collective formulation of opinions and demands. Thus, the institutional core of political rights is the right to

political communication and organization, that play an important role of a complete democratic regime. It expressed the unlimited validity of the right to freedom of speech and opinion and right to association, petition and demonstration. Moreover, private and public media should have significant influence (Merkel, 2012). As a result, citizens must have the opportunity to form an interest groups freely and independently from the state and be able to act within those groups. Accordingly, these rights comprise an independent scope of democracy and may regarded as the ‘backbone’ of a partial regime. Furthermore, the central importance of the institutionalized rights of freedom aim at the possibility of the formulation, the presentation and equal consideration of citizens (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). In this way, the first two regimes can only provide functional logic of democratic elections when they are reciprocally connected. However, both partial regimes still cannot provide alone the constitutional democratic standards of responsible and responsive governing (Merkel W., 2004).

2.5.1.4 Civil Rights

The civil rights supplemented the first two partial regimes. Along these lines, the civil rights are the central to the rule of law in an embedded democracy. Thus, rule of law is a principle that state should guarantee to uphold its law effectively and to act according to clearly defined privileges (Merkel, 2012). In constitutional democracy, decision concerning civil rights have to be put out of reach of any majority of citizen or parliament. Because, majoritarian democracies could turn into the ‘tyranny of the majority’. In this way, executive and legislative branches need barriers that prevent individuals, groups or political opposition from being oppressed by a democratic decision (Merkel W., 2004). Hence, civil rights are the basic form of the existence of the concept of citizenship. Individual rights of protection grant legal protection of freedom, life and property as well as the protection against illegitimate arrest, terror, exile, torture or unjustifiable intervention into personal life, both on behalf of the state and on behalf of private or anti-establishment forces and individual actors (Merkel W., 2004). As follows, equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law are basic civil rights. As a result, even interdependence and mutually supporting partial regimes of democratic elections, pluralistic free participation and guaranteed civil rights cannot efficiently support

constitutional democracy. Thus, still need additional supplementary support by other partial regimes (Merkel & Croissant, 2004).

2.5.1.5 Division of Power and Horizontal Accountability

The division of power and horizontal accountability is the fourth partial regime of a constitutional democracy that constitute the division of powers resulting to 'horizontal accountability (Merkel W., 2004). According to O'Donnell the horizontal accountability view elected authorities are being surveyed by a network of relatively autonomous institutions and held down to constitutionally defined lawful action. The one that is not covered by the first three partial regimes, is the institutionalization of horizontal accountability among state powers as a central gap of control in the basic democratic structures. Thus, through elections and referenda or through public sphere the institution of vertical accountability is controlled by government. Hence, structure of power is the power concerns of horizontal accountability (Merkel W., 2004). Accordingly, the term involved lawful government action checked by the division of power between mutually interdependent and autonomous executive, legislative and judiciary bodies. Along these lines, through horizontal accountability, the responsiveness and the responsibility of government are not only secured periodically by elections but also by permanently constitutional powers that mutually check and balance each other (Merkel & Croissant, 2004).

2.5.1.6 Effective Power to Govern

The effective power to govern expresses the needs that elected representatives are the ones that actually govern, considered as the fifth and last partial regime. In the old democracies the feature of the effective power to govern may be regarded as self-evident, but in the new democracies it cannot be taken for granted (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). Consequently, this condition prevents extra-constitutional actors not subject to democratic accountability, for example military, and other powerful actors from holding final decision-making power in policy domains. As follows, the area in which government and parliament do not possess sufficient decision-making authority and a problem of insufficient control over military and police, refers to so called reserved policy domains (Merkel W., 2004). Thus, it is decisive for the concept of embedded democracy that effective power to govern rests in the hands of democratically elected representatives. As

a result, reserved political domains should be strictly separated from political matters, which must be removed from arena of effectiveness of democratic majority decisions through constitutional consent, whether to secure the continued existence of the democracy itself, or to provide certain organs with more autonomy (Merkel, 2012).

2.5.1.7 Internal Embeddedness and External Embeddedness

The internal embeddedness described partial regimes in which can only function effectively in a democracy if they are mutually embedded. Thus, mutual embeddedness means two things (Merkel W., 2004). First, for example ‘political rights’ and ‘civil rights’ partial regimes support ‘democratic election partial regimes. In that way, some partial regimes support the functioning of another partial regime. Second, political actors in some partial regime guarantee that they do not interfere on the functional spheres of another regime, for instance the last three partial regimes (Merkel, 2012). Along these lines, functional and normative interdependence and independence describe the ‘code of communication’ between the five partial regimes. Moreover, the balance between them is delicate and varies from democracy to democracy.

On the other hand, external embeddedness portrays democracy embedded as a whole and the environment comprises, enables and stabilize democratic regime. Isolated defects or destabilization of the democracy itself is the result of the damage of the environment (Merkel W., 2004). Thus, democracy as externally embedded represents the conditions of possibility and impossibility that increase or decrease the quality of liberal democracy, but the components of democratic regime itself are not define. Furthermore, according to Wolfgang Merkel (2004), the mainly important externally embedded are the socio-economic context, civil society and international integration explain as follow.

2.5.1.8 Socio-Economic Context

According to Lipset, formulated the *locus classicus* correlation between the capability to sustain a democracy and socio-economic development of a society. Thus, it entails that the more well to do nation, the greater is the chances that it will sustain democracy. In line with that, Wolfgang Merkel (2012) presented two qualifying arguments. First, a well-develop and prospered economy is not the *condition sine qua non* for democracy, nor it can possibly use for economic development to predict threshold. Second, the economic transition zone is for the capability of democratization. Hence, the

importance of well-developed and prospering economy for the consolidation of democracy remains criticized. Accordingly, Wolfgang Merkel (2004), mentioned about inequality in which the unequal distribution of economic resources does not entails a striking gap between the wealth and income of different citizens, but just impels a consistent part of the population below the poverty lines, that created negative impact on democracy.

Consequently, prevention of extreme poverty, a developed economy, the pluralization of the social structure and a fair distribution of the material and cognitive resources of society establish a shield for democracy and enhances the quality of democracy in the realms of the rule of law and participation. Thus, lack of well-developed economy and abrupt downward economic change the threaten stability and quality of liberal democracy (Merkel & Croissant, 2004).

2.5.1.9 Civil Society

The principle of a well-developed civil society strengthens democracy has a long tradition. It based on important arguments developed by different philosophers. First, protect the individual from arbitrary use of state power by Locke. Second the support of the rule of law and the balance of power by Montesquieu. Third, educate citizens and recruit political elites by Tocqueville. Fourth, institutionalize the public sphere as a medium of democratic self-reflection by Habermas. Thus, according to Wolfgang Merkel (2012) if civil society achieve these functions, it generates and enables checks of power, societal inclusion, responsibility, fairness, trust, tolerance, cooperation and efficient implementation of accepted political programs (Merkel W., 2004). Along these lines, civil society not only develop the democratization, self-organization of society, and pacification but also controls, provide support for the state and makes it more effective and democratization. Moreover, civil society does not belong in the defining core of constitutional democracy in a strict sense. Because civil society is outside the core and be regarded as externally embedded. Therefore, the function of civil society carries out the considerable implications for the sustainability effect of democratic constitutional institutions (Merkel, 2012).

2.5.1.10 International and Regional Integration

The international and regional integration or politically democratic organization has significant effect for the quality and stability of democracy. Thus, NATO a military alliances or foreign-policy security structures, cannot enhances the same democratic effect even if they ruled by democratic states (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). Furthermore, the more consolidated and more irrepressible external embeddedness of democracy, the less vulnerable the internal partial regimes are toward external threats. Moreover, the more densely interdependence between the partial regimes is institutionalized, the stronger the cooperation between the actors of these regimes (Merkel W., 2004). Consequently, the higher the acceptance and respect towards the mutual independence the more democratic is the whole regime. On the other hand, inversely the weaker the external embeddedness and the lower mutual respect and cooperation between the actors of the partial regimes, the closer the regime is to defective democracy (Merkel, 2012).

2.6 Defective Democracies

The entire logic of constitutional democracy change if one of the partial regimes of an embedded democracy is damaged, in which one can no longer express of a whole embedded democracy. Thus, according to Wolfgang Merkel (2004) circumstances are then dealing with a certain type of defective democracy, depending on which of the partial regimes of an embedded democracy is damaged (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). As a result, from this standpoint, defective democracies are democracies in which there a no longer mutually embedded among the partial regimes and disruption occur in the logic of constitutional democracy.

2.6.1 Forms of Defective Democracy

Wolfgang Merkel (2004), distinguish four forms of defective democracies: exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy and delegative democracy explain as follows:

2.6.2 Exclusive Democracy

The basic concept of democracy is the sovereignty of the people and their fair execution and guaranteed universal electoral rights. Thus, it is not an incident if one or

all citizens who are adult are excluded from the universal suffrage which is one of their civil right (Merkel W., 2004).

2.6.3 Domain Democracy

A condition of “veto powers” such as the guerillas, entrepreneurs, military, militia, multi-national corporations or landlords acquire a certain political domain barred from the hands of democratically elected representatives. Thus, constitutional and extra-constitutional means take place upon the creation of such political domains (Merkel W., 2004). As a result, it can cause a more severe impairment to constitutional democracy, and lead to represents a form of defective democracy.

2.6.4 Illiberal Democracy

The illiberal democracy, amid its damaged and incomplete constitutional state, executive and legislative control of the state is inadequate by the judiciary. Hence, legitimate representatives are bound to constitutional principles. Moreover, constitutional norms, have lesser binding influence towards government actions and the civil rights of the individual are either partially not yet established or suspended (Merkel W., 2004). Therefore, in illiberal democracies the principle of rule of law is damaged, distress the actual core of liberal self-understanding for example the equal freedom of all individuals.


2.6.5 Delegative Democracy

The legislature and the judiciary in delegative democracy have only limited control over the executive. Thus, the actions of government are rarely committed to constitutional norms. There’s a destabilized checks and balances to maintain a balanced political representation. As a result, government mostly led by a charismatic president, circumvent parliament, influence the judiciary and damage the principle of legality, emasculate the checks and balances and transform the equilibrium of the balance of power favor to the executive unilaterally (Merkel W., 2004).

2.7 POPULISM TRENDS AROUND THE WORLD

The conflict between the virtuous “ordinary people” and “corrupt” elite frames the politics of populism. Thus, achieving the demand of the will of the people is must priority (Saguin, n.d.). A glance of populist around the world expose highly varied outcomes. Because some populist in countries rise to power with long histories of social

exclusion and take advantage their popular appeal and governing style of being a strongman to use the way in which societies became inclusive (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Some rise to power and strip down democratic checks and balances and brutally overpower oppositions. Others still frustrate independent institution and democratic processes but deliver economic growth (Moffitt, 2017). These are some of the multi-facet of populism around the world that seems interesting in their effects to countries stability. Across 33 countries between 1990 and today there are 46 populist leaders or political parties that have held office. During this period, populists peaked in power between 2010 and 2014, and again in 2018, when 20 populist leaders held executive office (see figure)



Source: Kyle, J., & Gultchin, L. (2018). Populism in Power Around the World. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3283962>

According to Kyle & Gultchin (2018), the rise of the global populism around this period is remarkable. According to Figure 1 around 1990 to 2018, there’s an increasing rate of 4 to 20, total of populist around the word in power. These, include Western Europe and Asia, not only in Latin America and Eastern and Central Europe in which populism is traditional dominant.

2.7.1 Populism Europe

The economic, cultural transformation and demographic have paved ways of opportunities in a specific forms of populist politics to represent in protecting people and their way of life against from external, from above or margins of society (Brubaker, 2017). In the case of Europe a large-scale immigration of the last half century and increasing number of segment postulated the most direct and consistent stimulus for protectionist populism in Western Europe (M., 2014). Because of this incident the immigration has to transform the structure of the labor market, substantially increased the ethnic, linguistic, religious and racial heterogeneity of the population and intensely change urban public space (Mudde, 2007). This has made an opportunities to demand protection of the jobs, cultural identity, welfare benefits and “way of life” of the people especially the “native” sometimes known as the citizen against this immigrants, Muslims in particular in Europe (Rooduijn et al., 2014). Resulting to culturally and economically protectionist forms of anti-immigrant populism have become habitual since the 1990s throughout the Western Europe (Stavrakakis, 2014). Today, populist parties in Western, Southern and Northern Europe have been decrease numerous and less powerful than in other parts of the world. As of now the only populist parties hold governmental power is in Italy, with the creation of Government of Change coalition of the Five Star Movement. And the other one the League in Greece, with the victory of Syriza party in the 2015 legislative election. (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018).

On the other hand of Eastern and Central Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia have long been a stronghold for populist politics. Around 2018, the populists have seized power in eight countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Serbia and Slovakia. According to Ben Stanley (2008) that there were two forms of populism immersed across Eastern, Central Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia. The interest of populism in the region grow from the fact that modification to democracy in the region were dominated by elites. Nevertheless, the breakdown of one party system and communist state structures allows for the restoration of cultural populists concerning to historic ethnic rivalries could exploit to rally support (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Thus, on the other hand, the history of long tyranny and one party rule nurture a political distrust

and anti-party attitudes which anti-establishment populists could use to further an ‘insider vs. outsider’(Laclau, 2005).

2.7.2 Populism in United States

The populism in United States is a style of politics that claims to speak for the ordinary people and frequently agitate distrust has risen up on both sides of the U.S history of political spectrum (Cotkin & Lasch, 2006). There are several leaders and political organizations that leadership approaches are into populist approach are the following: The Know Nothings in 1849-1860, who opposed to Catholics and immigrants and used the belief of white Christian supremacy to take political power over the populations of minority (Kazin, 2018), in 1874-1884 the known Greenback Party that initiated the control of inflation to support with debt and eight hours workdays as part of an extensive pro-labor (Budis, 2016), The Populist Party in 1892-1908 found out an official name as Populist Party, or People’s Party adopting the platform and support on foreign land ownership, and state control of railroad and of shortened work days of Greenback Party (Rose, 2016).

In addition, in the year 1893-1935 the leader Huey Long with the slogan of “Every man a King” controlled the wide in Louisiana, installing cronies into government agencies, having police more empowered, and increasing centralized power from the legislature (Kerkvliet, 2009), The Conservative Populism in 1900s moderate a conservative populism with presidential campaigns winning 18.9 percent of the popular vote in 1992 and 8.4 percent in 1996 of Ross Perot (Freedman, 1998), in the year 2000s The Tea Party burst the biggest populism in the 21st Century having an activist movements on each side of political spectrum (Pankowski, 2010). Thus, in the year 2011 the Occupy Wall Street surge into action following financial crisis of 2011(Kyle & Gultchin, 2018) and lastly Donald Trump in the year 2016 with a slogan “Make America Great Again sought to undo agreements that he felt damaged the United States especially the immigration and take an aggressive, isolationist to other countries including allies (Budis, 2016).

2.7.3 Populism Southeast Asia’s

The populism is moving expansion in Southeast Asia not just merely in Europe and North America (Curato, 2019). The populist autocratic inclined in South Asia

previously in power and still trying to win power incorporate strategies claiming themselves as outsiders who can settle problems failed by the elites by dealing tactics engaging weak groups within society and approaches to crime (Kenny, 2018). In which for some scholars these actions destabilize democracy. The Thailand and Philippines are two countries with biggest economies, facing a populist autocratic-leaning leaders and followed by Indonesia possibly administered by a populist leader in the next presidential election (Cotton, 2006). In Europe and North America populist differ in many ways from Southeast Asia. Because it emphasis less on immigration, economic decline and trade. On the other hand, in Southeast Asia the growth of economy remains strong because the countries are extremely dependent on immigration and trade are not a primary issue. (Hellmann, 2017). Thus, the principal source with one of the highest citizens percentage working abroad is in Philippines (Hedman, 2014).

Accordingly, Southeast Asian populist focus more on ethnic and religious divides, defying drug trafficking and got interest to the lower and working class (Hellmann, 2017). Thus, lower-middle class have become unfulfilled with the democracy because for them politicians have not undertaken inequality, delivered efficient governance and addressed crime (Aspinall, Weiss, & Tan, n.d.). There are three autocratic-leaning populism in Southeast Asian countries. (Moffitt, 2015a). In Philippines and Thailand increasing public distrust towards democracy, as well as ethnic and division of region and autocratic rules in the history(Cotton, 2006). While, in Indonesia conspicuously over two decades patterns of democracy in which the incumbent officials confront the presidential election hold in April 2019 with major populist challenge (Okamoto, 2009).

Philippines. Compare to the populist leader in the countries of Hungary or Poland, the Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte since 2016, has a greater scale in permitting violence and destabilizing the government check on power. (Desker, 2016). Duterte imposed drastic war on drugs that resulted to killings of at least twelve thousands people at most through extrajudicial killings (Schultz & Vile, 2019). Even though in Southeast Asia middle class learned about the posts of democracy, however both lower, middle and upper class still have increasingly supported the strongmen (Cotton, 2006). According to Richard Javad Heydarian a knowledge about Duterte style, note:

“The appeal of populists and strongmen in these countries lies in their uncanny ability to tap into collective frustrations most especially among aspirational middle classes over the inefficacy of state institutions to accommodate new voices and provide basic goods and services.”

Subsequently, media and freedom to politics are visible in both ethnic and Southeast Asia religious groups (Hellmann, 2017). The main source was brought in the region through social media and promoting massive online discourse (Krämer, 2017). Because most of the populist have master the tools in easily reaching the populations through the use of social media(Krämer, 2017). For instance the “army of Facebook bloggers and personalities that was reported by Bloomberg Businessweek that was created by Duterte administration (Casiple, 2016).

Thailand. Thaksin Shinawatra adopted strategies in populism by establishment of elites in the military, the royal Privy Council, the Interior Ministry, rival political parties and old money conglomerates. Moreover, his courage with the poor, in connection with his sustained self-enrichment while in office, alarmed the middle class, who increasingly seen his policies as exclusivist (Hallerberg, Kayser, & Kreibohm, 2013). Thus, Thai Rakk Thai could not beaten in competitive elections, they deserted their democratic commitments and created a branded ‘new politics’, a strategy to replace the rule of majority with military appointments to the regulatory agencies and legislature (Thitinan, 2005). Thus, with these incident general ruled by mounting an authoritarian backlash, overthrowing Thaksin via coup in 2006, the his successor, his sister, Yingluck, through another coup in 2014 (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009).

Thaksin Shinawatra an autocratic-leaning populist reigned from 2001 to 2006, tried to resolve the failure of inequality between parties and the 1997 Asian financial crisis (De Castro, 2008). Thaksin implemented war on drugs same with the style of Duterte and introduced massive programs on social welfare (Thitinan, 2005). The coup in 2006 result to the upper and middle class opposing strategies towards populist resulted to a democracy to be destabilize (Pasuk, n.d.). However, the parties of pro-Thaksin still succeeded election, but compared to Thaksin it was less autocratic. In 2014 coup the military charge the pro-Thaksin government and transform the politics

environment into tyrannical (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). Thus, putting back into the hand of a populist Thaksin's party still could triumph and popular (Moffitt, 2015a).

Indonesia. Some analyst argue in the realms of populism in Indonesia concerning to the victory of Widodo in presidential election, is a populist too, but a new type, widely embracing and humbly born (Tria Kerkvliet, 2009). Thus, to make clear Widodo presented a canvassed of health care cards for poor, also scaled back popular fuel subsidies, laid great stress on port development and fisheries, and propose less prioritizing of any redistribution that decision making technocratic(Hallerberg et al., 2013). Furthermore, Widodo claims to be "polite" in approach to campaigning and policy formulation, and anti-rich sentiments provoking middle class exclusion and elite divisions(Eby Hara, 2018).

2.8 Typology of Populism

Three key elements of populist discourse outlines previously 'elites', 'the people' and 'the others' since social media demonstrated populism manifestation itself in a fragmented form and because of this fragmentation 'could be an empirical expression of populism's "thin" nature and "inherent incompleteness" (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). Starting from the typology of populist discourse by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) four elements of different types of messages combined according to their content:

1. Complete populism statements containing references to all the three key elements;
2. Empty populism statements containing only "the people" as reference;
3. Excluding populism statements containing references to 'the others' and post containing 'the people' and 'the others' as reference;
4. Anti-elitist populism statements containing 'the elites' and statements containing 'the people' and 'the elites'

Jagers and Walgrave operationalized complete and empty populism: in the first case statements includes all the key elements together, while in the second case, those statements include only to 'the people' (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). On the other hand, exclusionary and an-elitist populism, considering references to 'the elites' and 'the others' in a given statements, the combination of these with 'the people' is taken into account.

(Bobba, 2018). In the category of ‘elites’ it can be classified criticism of blame attribution for example to banks, politicians, judicial system, media etc. In the category of people placed in the reference to the ‘common man’. Lastly, in the category of ‘others’ were criticism of blame attribution for example the immigrants, homosexual, Muslims, welfare recipients, and Roma communities (Bobba, 2018).

2.9 POPULISM PRACTICING IDEOLOGY

The reason that the concept of populism is complex to identify because it follow to other isms like liberalism, communism or socialism and frequently assert themselves as socialist, liberals or communists (Rose, 2016; Saguin, n.d.). Populist gap, towards the People’s Party is that they rarely call themselves as populist (K. A. Hawkins, 2010). Thus, most scholars, journalist and other actors of the movements are the one who labeled them as a phenomena of populist (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). There are four categories of populist practices that are visible most of the country:

Table 2.1 Mapping and Classification of Populism Practicing Ideology

Key Concepts	Adoption or use target	Indicators	Author/s
1. Political Style	performance, activity claim, a representation	appeal to people	Moffitt and Tormey; (2014); Mair (2016), Moffitt & Tormey; (2014); Moffitt, (2017); Saward, (2010); Moffitt, (2015); Kyle & Gultchin, (2018); Brubaker, (2017); Gidron & Bonikowski, (2014); Knight, (1998); Rode & Revuelta, (2014)
2. Political Strategy	economic redistribution, anti-establishment and anti-system appeals, nationalization of natural resources	policy choices, political organization and forms of mobilization	Gidron & Bonikowski, (2014); Madrid, (2008); Acemoglu et al, (2010); Acemoglu Georgy Egorov Konstantin Sonin et al., (2011); Wyland’s, (2001); Weyland, (2007); Robert (2006); Jansen, (2011);

3. Political Communication	ways of acting, speaking, looking, handling and displaying things employing high emotional, slogan based, tabloid-style language, appealing to emotions of fear and enthusiasm or resentment	stagecraft, popularizing	Pels, (2012); Krämer, (2017); Catlin & Edelman, (2006); Pels, (2012); Friedman, (2017); Bracciale & Martella, (2017); Kyle & Gultchin, (2018); Sabl, (2015); Mookherjee, (2014); Canovan, (2004), Müller, (2016)
4. Performing Crisis	particular failure and create social division	recognize the failure, promote the level of crisis, form ‘the people’ vs those responsible others, employ media to publicized performance and Straightforward solutions	Nolan & Brookes, (2016); Curato, (2019); Kyle & Gultchin, (2018); Aspinall, (2015); Cotkin & Lasch, (2006); De Cleen et al., (2018), Rode & Revuelta, (2014); Moffitt, (2015); Laclau, (2005); Arditì, (2003); Freedman & Scalmer, (2010); Rooduijn et al., (2014); Krämer, (2017); Stavrakakis, (2014); Moffitt & Tormey, (2014); McCarthy, (1996); Bullimore, (2004)

Table 2.1 presents the mapping and classification of populism practicing ideology as per review of related studies. A characteristics of various populism practicing ideology established by different authors and scholars.

2.9.1 Political Style

Populism as a political style deals with a new promising perspective that helps solve the existing issues in the literature. Why a “style” of politics? According to Knight (1998) viewed populism as a “loose style” illustrated most of the time in a period of crisis, mobilization and contain representation towards connection of “the people”, and “them and us” mentality. This has led to the study of Moffitt and Tormey, 2014 to focused on the reflexive modernity of populism as a political style in order to recognize the shape of politics. In line with that, decreasing displacement of class appeal, ideological cleavages and citizen to be alien from the traditional party policies was brought by the failure to legitimize traditional or mainstream politics. (Mair, 2016). That has led to the increasing political “stylization” . Thus, political style as a concept is define as a performance that used to produce political relation

(Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). The wide range of political style in the contemporary landscape of politics are identified involving technocratic, authoritarian, post representative style, populist and tropes that create and affect political relations (Moffitt, 2017). Example of practitioners of these key respective political style are Mahmoud Ahmadibejad, Angela Merkel, Hugo Chavez and Marcos. Moffitt and Tormey, 2014, argued that the populist political style can be evaluated through how the performance influence the relationship between populist leader and “the people”. First case, populism as a political style based on the aspects of behavior of the performance. Consequently, populism is a style that is performed and enacted (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). As such with political style a birth of understanding emerged on how performance can be used by different political actors, instead of simply having a populism appeal (Moffitt, 2015a). Second, Michael Saward (2010) argued, political representation in a contemporary form, fundamentally depends on the activity claim and “audience” to which the claim is addressed receive whether accepted or rejected such claims.

Furthermore, Saward (2010) claims that the action of the political actors are representing combine with performing, and base of the performance it can add towards a claim that somebody can be a representative. Thus, the significance of performance in politics even more visible as the 24 hours news cycle, and projected image among politician have increasingly important, often analyzing their proposed policies (Moffitt, 2015a). In addition, politicians have attain a their stylistic feature in a pseudo-celebrities and protest in a political event to gain attention such as bus tours, truck convoy and flash-mobs rather than a content of a tradition output. Subsequently, important regard to political style is with the performance, a term for how juridical power inevitably produces what it claim to represent (Moffitt, 2017). For example, when populist represent to speak in the name of the people, they produce what they claim by representing and covering up the gap in the society and claiming to have direct contact to the people.

2.91.1 Appeal to People

The primary element that segregate populism to other political styles is the appeal to “the People”. The people is the essential audience of populism, that through

their performance populist attempt to ‘render present’ (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Moreover, the true holders of sovereignty are “the people”. Thus, the related appeal to the people is the division of the society between the people and the other. Populist put up themselves as a picture of the true people. For example Former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez used Chávez es Pueblo (Chávez is the people!) as a slogan, Alberto Fujimori, from 1990 to 2000 Peru’s populist president, the slogan Fujimori, a campaigned slogan presidente como usted (Fujimori, a president like you) and Duterte in the Philippine (change is coming) (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018).

As an expression of the general will of the people populist claim to have a full support of the people (Brubaker, 2017). Even though they do not got the 100 percent of the votes, still they claim a vote coming from a true people as 100 percent in which the only members in the political community that they recognize legitimate (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). A portion of claiming represent the true people contains a particular political style. In which idealizing the wisdom of the common people (Rode & Revuelta, 2014). Such as vulgar the bad manners in politics, political incorrectness and rejecting the typical rigid language of technocratic politics. Because most of the time populist movements try to connect with the culture of ordinaries (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018).

2.9.2 Political Strategy

Scholars advocate understanding of populism as mode of strategy in which this approach was prevalent among the sociologist and political scientist working in Latin America encompasses a three variants of political strategy focusing: policy choices, political organization and forms of mobilization (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). First, in Latin America populism takes form of particular economic policies and mas mobilization (Raúl L. Madrid, 2008).

2.9.2.1 Policy Choice

Simultaneously, populist policies aiming for economic redistribution, populist mobilization consisting of anti-establishment and anti-system appeals, and nationalization of natural resources. According to Acemoglu et al (2010) the focus of policy and populism implement policies that affects the economic interest of the majority even though it gained significant support from the population. Thus, populism employ policies method through redistribution arrangement and political actor practice a language

of being a populist to gain attention among the ordinary citizens/voter that they will not jeopardize the economic interest of a country (Acemoglu Georgy Egorov Konstantin Sonin et al., 2011). Kurt Weyland's, 2001 argue in the definition of populism as a political strategy through which a political actor or personalistic leader strive or exercise powers of the government based on unmediated, direct, uninstitutionalized support from unorganized large number of followers.

2.9.2.2 Political organization

The second approach to populism in terms of political organization. The difficulties of these definitions center on identifying modes of organization or strategy that are visible within political spectrum across in many different ways of articulations that calling populist would never consider ordinary (Weyland, 2007). In line with that, what matters in Weyland, 2010 definition focuses not on the content of policies or style used by a political actor but rather the relationship that a certain political actor build toward their constituent. Robert (2006) argues that in Latin America populist politics were visible on four distinct forms produced between the degree of organization of civil society for example the consolidation of strong labor unions and degree of organization of the party system for example the manner in which populist parties are ready for competing in the electoral arena. Next to that, the extreme partisan civil society organization leads to populism; in which these partisan organization and depleted civil society organization gives rise to partisan populism; high civil society organization and weak partisan structure that is associated with labor populism; and low level of organization both dimensions linked with electoral populism (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014).

Populism as political organization place a focused on to the relation and identity of the political leaders (Acemoglu Georgy Egorov Konstantin Sonin et al., 2011). For example, a strong charismatic leader lead the populist parties characterized by centralized organization in particular lack of key values populism can be liable to the politics of personality (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014). Barros (2005) argues that charismatic populist leader emphasis the linkage between their supporters and populist movements that once a populist take the power, they tend to use clientelism in addition to plebiscitarian linkages.

2.9.2.3 Political mobilization

Populism as a pattern of political mobilization is the third focus of political strategy. Furthermore, Jansen (2011) argues that stable populism ideology, can be seen in a project of politics which can be done by various political incumbents in pursuing a wide range of agenda in regards to political, social and economic. There two dimension of the third approach the mobilization and discourse. The populist mobilization sustained, through a huge political projects that help marginalized ordinary social sectors and visible publicly while maintaining the nationalist rhetoric of common people and anti-elite (Jansen, 2011). On the other hand, populist discourse, suggest an inherent virtuous people and social unity that people in hostile relationship with the anti-popular elite (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2014).

2.9.3 Political Communication

The general definition of political communication in populism is a heterogeneous style of ways of acting, speaking, looking, handling and displaying things. In which it emerged into symbolic as a whole combined with manner and matter, message and package, arguments and ritual (Pels, 2012). This definition incorporate the non-verbal and verbal elements to produce up a unique set of communicative performance that encompasses the diverse communication patterns of different political actors (Krämer, 2017). Because of this definition there are two aspects exist in the political communication: form and content. The two aspect influence events and interact with each other, to the point that style generated content and content generate style (Moffitt, 2017; Pels, 2012). Based on these two aspects, political communication support “what is being said” and how it is being said.

2.9.3.1 Stagecraft

Stagecraft is one of the perspective in the form and content of populism aspect that symbolizes dimension of doing politics delved in the frontstage performance approach (Catlin & Edelman, 2006). A characteristic of political communication that can be analyzed in regards to both populism and popularizing of politics. The act of populism is through the mechanism of simplification, employing high emotional, slogan based,

tabloid-style language, appealing to emotions of fear and enthusiasm or resentment (Pels, 2012).

2.9.3.2 *Popularizing*

The second one is the popularizing process as a form defined by intimate, personalization and celebrity politics (S. L. Friedman, 2017). The key features of popularization categories into a political style of emotionalization, dramatization, personalization, anti-establishment attitude and simplification because they are suitable in the logic of media. (Bracciale & Martella, 2017). For the populist institution and actors that normally facilitate the connection between voters and politician such as the political parties, media, civil organization should be serve special interest towards the will of people to carried (Tilly, n.d.). For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was interviewed on the radio every Friday to maintain his direct connection with the people. Correspondingly, Chávez hosted *Aló Presidente*, a television that represent ordinary citizens could call in to talk to the president about their concerns (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Hence, social media has become a powerful tool for populist by having a possible connection directly between the people and their voice (Sabl, 2015). Thus, populist use personalistic way in reaching voters instead of connecting voters through platform and political parties (Mookherjee, 2014).

Populist also create and use political organization, some have direct linkages with their followers, others build civil society organization to create structure and disciple among followers (Canovan, 2004). For example Bolivia's Morales, rise onto the political scene as the leaders of social movements. More personalistic populism relies on what political scientist Kenneth Roberts terms "direct, noninstitutionalized, and unmediated relationships with unorganized followers", while populists rising from social movements build organizations in civil society, positioning themselves as the leaders of these organizations' (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Thus, populist are not universally in contradict with the institution. According to Müller, they "only oppose those institutions that, in their view, fail to produce the correct political outcomes" that is, those outcomes that favor the populist (Müller, 2016).

2.9.4 Performing Crisis

Populist first classify particular failure and create social division. The failures such as a threat of drug users or criminals threat to national safety, or the presence of imported goods pose to national jobs and production and immigrant communities threat to national unity and culture (Nolan & Brookes, 2016). Populist are expert of linking problems in the society into one policy and making it appear as a systematic and broad citizens unfulfilled demands (Curato, 2019). For example populist may attack the elites failure to address public concerns about immigration with their failure to address peoples concern about crime and using these cases in targeting about the concern of the people welfare (Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Most scholars identified as “right without democracy” because citizens may have the right to vote however for some reason what the issue they care about the most is not even considered as an important matter for elites (Aspinall, 2015; Cotkin & Lasch, 2006; De Cleen et al., 2018; Rode & Revuelta, 2014).

How do populist actors performing crisis? Based on the study conducted by Moffitt, 2015 the researcher adapted only five principal actions that most populist do to elevate the level of crisis and dispensing in looking to divide the people from those who will to blame for the crisis and give straightforward solutions towards the crisis. The following are the approach of the performance of crisis in populism:

1. Recognize the failure
2. Promote the level of crisis
3. Form ‘the people’ vs those responsible others
4. Employ media to publicized performance
5. Straightforward solutions

2.6.4.1 Recognize Failure

The matter of concern in performing crisis is to identify or choose particular failure. The ability to recognize failure to the level of crisis will probably more achievable if the chosen crisis has some political salience. For example, a moment of economic instability, a populist actor may tend to focus on the failure/crisis of the pollical class in order to protect ordinary people from the bankers. Another example of salient in sociocultural issue: Australian populist Pauline Hanson and New Zealander populist Winston Peters tend to focus of the failure of Asian immigration in their countries or the

Geert Wilders Dutch populist primarily focused on the Muslim immigration failure in the Netherlands. The populist actors often center on the failure of political representative or elites. Thus, populists are not merely a political actor with single issue politicians but rather than a seeker of a specific failure as a motive of gaining attention and making up a sense of crisis (Moffitt, 2015b).

2.9.4.2 Promote the level of crisis by linking into a wider framework

In recognizing certain failure populists' next move is to link this chosen failure with other failures into a wider structural framework. Laclau (2005) argues in his demand theory which remains that unfulfilled or unanswered by the actor, system or institution that is addressed for example a demand to reduce the level of immigration addressed to the government will be linked with other unfilled demands. The further the unfilled demands are covered the weaker the connections become to the initial demand. Thus, the initial demand started to represent as a 'floating signifier' that function to the different demands (Laclau, 2005). The key to populism political saliency increase the 'emptiness' of the initial demand: 'the so called "poverty" the most used populist symbols in the conditions of their political worth (Arditi, 2003). Performance crisis of populist actors come in through mediated operation such as rally, interview, speech, written piece, press release and other medium. Thus, populist actors connect failures in an attempt to set up the phenomenon as a symptoms of a wider crisis. One example to present the linkage of failure as crisis through populist performance:

Australia

The first is the maiden speech of Pauline Hanson's to the Australian Parliament in 1996. Pauline Hanson able to link a perceived failures such as bureaucracy, unemployment, multiculturalism, reverse racism, welfare payments to Aboriginal Australians, government huge investment to project development, immigration, foreign debt, United Nations, privatization of government assets, national military service, interest rates and the size of Asian surround Australia (Freedman & Scalmer, 2010). She wrapped all national issue into multiculturalism framework and brand a national disgrace and crisis. Pauline Hanson a key player in Australian politics with her chose 'crisis' of multiculturalism gained a huge debate and attention.

2.9.4.3 Form 'the people' vs those responsible for the crisis

The moment the initial failure has been identified and connect to a wider crisis of framework, the populist actor is able to assert who are to blame the responsible for the crisis, and produce against 'the people' that were distressed by the negative effects of the crisis. Consequently there should be a reliable identification of the enemy to give emphasis to 'the people' identity for the populist to be sure who they are and who they are not (Saguin, n.d.). The elite and the social group provides the populist with an enemy. However, performance crisis to assist this group identification in two ways. First, it enable populist actors to link the elite with the social groups, who together can be used to opposed to 'the people' in performing crisis. Second, performing crisis offers populist actors to look rationale as objective for targeting enemies beyond discrimination. For example;

Western Europe

Jean-Marie Le Pen, a radical right populist actors give emphasis towards the efforts of exclusionary on non-native group such as journalist, academics, elite including the Muslims (Rooduijn et al., 2014). In this case, the elite is expect in advocating, designing and endorsing policies that will benefit the group of minority that engaged in the situation, directing to a crisis that radically affects the people.

2.9.4.4 Use media to broadcast performance

Through the use of media the circulation of success or failure of performing crisis relies populist performance. Thus, media play an important role in the broadcasting information about breaking crisis. A study of European radical right populist actors get media attention in which politicians will have to be conscious with their style, behavior, or in terms of their messages. Through the media events, the populist actors perform and promote the sense of crisis to attract wide attention and recognize enemies of the people and garner salience for the particular threat. The media event were inspired by populist through offering issues to the public discourse in order to encourage building opinion, inspiration and promote or stage these events as a focus part of performing crisis (Moffitt, 2015b). The political communication on populism provide us with some evidence including the radio or television, press, conference, speeches that prevalent 'hit issues'

on crime or immigration, and making controversial statements in areas of public (Krämer, 2017).

2.9.4.5 Simple solutions and strong leadership

Through a number of performative method a populist actors can do so, including offering simple answer for the crisis, portraying other political actors as incompetent and unable, and advocating simplifying political institution and processes (Stavrakakis, 2014). To represent other political actors as ignorant and incompetent the true crisis will apply and allow populist actors to position themselves the ‘straight shooters’ who cut through the problem. (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014).

Italy and Netherlands

Silvio Berlusconi, in Italy made clear that he was not interested in the ‘abstract principles’ of party politics and claim that “whenever I hear that Forza Italia is a party, I get shiver down my spine” (McCarthy, 1996). Populist thus, claim themselves as being beyond loyal of everyday politics and rather focus on the urgency of crisis it is ready for action and armed solution. While in Netherlands, parliamentary group of chairman of the Danish People Party faced by stemming Danish financial crisis are simple; if descendants workers and non-western immigrants worked the same, then the economic crisis would immediately better, problem sustainable would be solved and Danish economic growth would expand (Bullimore, 2004).

2.10 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of populism has been labelled variously as style, pathology, a syndrome and a doctrine. Over the years theoretical developments of populism has been debated to its definition as a thin ideology (Stanley, 2008b). This study is firstly anchored on the Laclau’s discourse theoretical approach that search for the importance of the content in the primary principles and policies, that draw attention to the popular/elite antagonism of populism (Laclau, 2005). Discourse theoretical approaches to populism says something about the relationship between “the elite” and “the people” this approach respond to populism as a product of relationship (Laclau, 2005; Stanley, 2008a). Populism is anticipated upon the antagonistic relationship between an entities if two and possibly occurs an emergence of dichotomy (Stanley, 2008a). A class of relationship is a

description of Laclau's original thesis that sited about antagonisms. However, populism as an association with class politics has been criticized for its failure to address the heterogeneous nature of the people of populist politics (De Cleen et al., 2018).

The sphere of Laclau's theory has been develop and give emphases towards the socio-institutional structure of populist discourse (Bullimore, 2004). The populism discourse encompasses of a counter position interest of a collectivity that recognize people against the elite. Thus, according to Laclau (2005) that populism emerge through the unfulfilled demands of the people. Because fulfilment has to do with the political logic of populism in which the social groups demands are individually satisfied and the elite is capable to hold back the occurrence of antagonism and logic of difference emerge (Stanley, 2008a). In addition, the logic of difference dominates, elites are incapable of addressing a number of different demands, and antagonism arises between the people and the elite presuppose bringing together a plurality of social demands (De Cleen et al., 2018). Therefore, populism cannot be locate towards the appeal to people, but in the aspect of the degree in which equivalence of logic will prevail rather than the differences (Bullimore, 2004; De Cleen et al., 2018; Laclau, 2005).

This study is also anchored to Wolfgang Merkel model of three hypothetical scenarios that will develop in the majority of new democracies. First, regression scenario found in a 'cycle of political crises', in which the structures through liberalism and rule of law and the conservation of democratic norms weaken in defective democracies (Merkel W., 2004). As a result, there is an additional concentration of political power in executive, breaking the principle of the rule of law and directing to extend informalization of political procedures and decisions. Thus, a formally democratic shell remains but significant political decisions are made outside of it. In addition, a regression scenario lead into an authoritarian regime (Merkel & Croissant, 2004). Consequently, a free and fair elections, political rights, civil rights and horizontal accountability are damaged or diminished but exchange by authoritarian zone. Second, stability scenario in which a defect of democracy demonstrates to be more effective that open authoritarian rule in safeguarding the system's stability. In line with that, an existing respect towards the government problem solving and based on the underdeveloped nature of the civic culture and the decision of relevant political elites (Merkel W., 2004).

Thus, a formal web of democratic institutions and informal decisions of semi-autocratic making leads to a self-perpetuating equilibrium of power. Hence, a stabilized status quo of defective democracy established. In this way, it is stable as long as the specific defects of the democracy, provide to strengthening the elites and satisfying the interest of the supporters in the system (Merkel, 2012). Third, progression scenario anchored in to the informal structures of democracy that appeared to be incompatible with the formal democratic structures and a burden towards the fulfillment of the demands of the society (Merkel W., 2004). Thus, the learning process are only available towards the significant elites, resulting in increased resistance to the informal arrangements that restrict democracy, and increase fulfillment with the constitutional rules of decision making.

Lastly, this study employ the theory of media populism that pay concentration on the main distinct phenomenon for understanding populism among the politics of the “native” media themselves whether populist movement is dependent or independent(Anastova, 1999). Politics of populism create a view of the function of political system that is connected to populist media. Ben Stanley (2008) argues that his clam to populism is connected with the set of ideas to which the concept of the people is important but goes no further in justifying the distinct mode of populist ideology. The theory of media populism is a matter not of the feature which is common but of degree that media are the collective actors of the bigger organizational structure surrounded with channel and platforms of mass communication (Anastova, 1999). In line with that, people build their opinion based to ‘media logic’ in politics that becomes part of usual politics. Weber (1992) named it as a vision of ‘plebiscitary democracy’ when leaders of a certain party become a ‘plebiscitary dictators’ with the ability to mobilize the people through the machine apparatus.


This research paper contends a need to explore study concerning populism because literature illustrate that it has not been studied that well. This research looks into the populist approach of President Duterte regimes and how it affect the quality of democracy in the Philippines.

2.11 Research Framework

The competency of a large network of people, known as ‘crowd’, connected through Web technologies, is gradually recognized by researchers and practitioners (Charalabidis, Loukis, Androutsopoulou, Karkaletsis, & Triantafillou, 2014). Thus, crowdsourcing is the procedure of acquiring needed services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people. Though, in the past hindered by the communication challenges would expect to encounter at a time before the internet. The moment internet played role in the world evolution, social media is changing the way people think of crowdsourcing and continue to do so with the social media benefit to crowdsource become more well-known (Marchionda, 2015). Hence, social media is becoming a important component to crowdsourcing as it allow organizations to reach a wider audience faster, cheaper and more efficiently compared before. Crowdsourcing is an internet based problem and solving distribution that has develop over the years. Thus, crowdsourcing according to most scholars is a method that can be used to process a large amount of data from various areas (Charalabidis et al., 2014).

Figure 4 is based crowdsourcing framework (Marchionda, 2015), typology of populism (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), Duterte’s popular policies and democracy report from Freedom House 2016-2019. In populism there are four identified ideological practices: political style, political communication, political strategy and performing crisis. According to Jager & Walgrave, 2007 the best way to measure populist political communication is true speeches. Hence, Duterte speeches is the most valuable source for content and text analysis. Thus, the content and text analysis of Duterte speeches will be categorize through the typology of populism: complete populism, empty populism, excluding populism an anti-elitism. On the other hand, political strategy, political style and performing crisis analysis will varies upon the data gather in social media specifically twitter with the following hashtags: #TrainLaw, #BuildBuildBuild #Warondrugs. The analysis centered on the Presidents vocal stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policy, and the tax reform program of the government. Thus, the researcher believe that these policies have a high degree of incoherence and inconsistency in Duterte’s brand of populism.

All the variables will go through an evaluation of a quality of democracy. The Freedom House will be the research preferred source of data from the start of Duterte's administration 2016 up to the present. Consequently, this research will use Wolfgang Merkel model of democracy from the root concept of embedded democracies and defective democracies.



2.11.1 Social Media as platform of Populism

In the late 1990s of the history of Internet promote a theoretical relation between populism and online communication was already established (Bimber, 1998). Some scholars argued that with the potential of the Internet it can able to ‘restructure political power in a populist direction’ and between politician and citizens it promote unmediated communications (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). Social media such as networking sites microblogging service (e.g., Twitter) and (e.g., Facebook) play a vital part among contemporary parties with regards to political communication strategies (Linh & Stieglitz, 2012). Virality is the foundation logic of social media, requires political actors to communicate mainly those messages that users promote, comment, like and share within their network (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). However, it is not enough for political actors to preserve only in social media, they also need to be linked to many others because of the high numbers of Twitter followers and Facebook friends signal a popularity (Ernst et al., 2017a).

Within these networks, there are two distinct ways politicians can communicate (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2013). First, the direct communication to the politicians followers and friends, in which it reach their ‘primary audience’. In line with that, it relates to the model of a one-step flow communication introduced by Bennett and Manheim (2006). Thus, with the direct communication is re-circulated by their followers, politicians might be able to extend their networks to reach a ‘secondary audience’ (Bechmann & Lomborg, 2013). On the other hand, the indirect communication, is a mediated choices of the primary audience and not controlled by the politician itself, it follows the logic of two step flow of communication (Willigan, Katz, & Lazarsfeld, 2007). Thus, the secondary audience potential for political actors should not be underestimated, because followers of political actors are primary active opinion leaders on Facebook or people who have high appearance on Twitter (Ernst et al., 2017a)

The purpose for the use of social media by populist actor can be emphasize by further theoretical considerations (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). The recent developments in political communications Chadwick (2013) identified a hybrid media system where ‘older and newer media logics complement and compete each other (Chadwick, 2014). Hence, building the idea of hybridity Klinger and Svensson (2015, 2016) differentiate the

mass media logic of professional news outlet from the network logic of social media. Thus, in terms of production content, the mass media logic adheres to professional norms and news values and the network media logic follows the ideal of ‘attention maximation’ (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). On the other hand, populist actor engage in a hybrid communication strategy to address the mass media in order to disseminate official statements to larger audience (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). These statements/messages have to go through mass media logic and may be tailored by the journalist (Of, Parties, Scroll, & For, 2015).

The journalist of the upmarket press are assumed to act a ‘paladins’ of the elites and to criticize populist statements in their articles. In which, populist may turn towards the social media in order to in order to avoid the media institutions and journalistic gatekeepers. Thus, in this way the populist messages do not have to follow the news values and are normally more personal and sensationalistic in nature (Engesser, Ernst, et al., 2017). Therefore, social media have change the style of politician communicate with and relate to their constituencies during election campaigns and routine periods alike (Bobba, 2018). Social media provide a powerful tool for populist to use mobilize their followers, in addition to the traditional channels of political communication and mainstream of media (Kriesi, 2013). Comparing to the 1990s, populist parties earned visibility by the used of tabloid media coverage, the beginning and widespread presence of social media such as Facebook and Twitter produces a ways of directly and spontaneously communication with the citizen (Bartlett, 2014).

2.14 Duterte’s Popular Policies

2.14.1 Train Law

The Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) envisioned by President Duterte’s as the first package of the comprehensive tax reform program (CTRP). It seeks to correct a number of insufficiencies in the tax system to make it easier, fairer and more efficient. Thus, it also includes alleviating measures that are plan to redistribute some of the gains to the poor. Through TRAIN, every Filipino subsidize in funding more social services and infrastructure to eradicate extreme poverty and lessen inequality towards the welfare for all. Hence, TRAIN deals with several weaknesses of the current tax system

by reducing and simplifying personal income taxes, expanding the value-added tax (VAT), simplifying estate and donor's taxes, automobile excise taxes and adjusting oil, and introducing excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Furthermore, tax reform fund the institution like education, health care services and infrastructure programs.

In education the tax reform will be able to fund investment, by achieving a more favorable learning environment with epitome teacher to student ration and classroom to student ratio. By achieving the 100% enrollment and completion rates build of 113,553 more classrooms and between 2017-2020 hire 181,980 more teachers. Moreover, in healthcare services the tax reform invest more in the country by providing better services and facilities. By upgrading 704 local hospitals and establish 25 local hospitals. Achieving 100% PhilHealth coverage at higher quality services, improving or relocating 263 rural and urban health units to disaster-resilient facilities, and building 15,988 new barangay health stations. Futhermore, developing 2,424 new rural health units and urban health centers, between 2017 and 2022 hire an additional 2,424 doctors and 29,466 nurses, 1,114 dentists, 3,288 pharmacists, 2,682 medical technologist, 911 public heath associates and 2,497 UHC implementers. On the other hand, in infrastructure programs and additional revenue raised by tax reform will be utilize in order to fund the infrastructure program of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), which involves major highways, flood control projects and expressways. Thus, these funding of major infrastructure projects is possible with tax reform in order to sustain high and inclusive growth in the country.

In addition, TRAIN lowers personal income tax (PIT) for all taxpayers except the richest. Through the TRAIN, below P250,000 annual taxable income are exempt from paying PIT, while the rest of taxpayers, except the richest, will see lower tax rates ranging from 15% to 30% by 2023. In ordder to maintain progressivity, the top individual taxpayers whose annual taxable income exceeds P8 million, meet a higher tax rate from current 32% to 35%. Morover, a husbands and wives who are both working can benefit from a total of up to P500,000 in exemptions. The first P90,00 of the 13th month pay and other bonuses will be exempt from income tax. Thus, the overall effective tax rates will be lowered for 99% of tax payers. Consequently, a person who has a taxable income of P500,000 annually is taxed ar 32% at the margin. The TRAIN will bring this down to

25% in 2018 and will be further brought down 20% after five years. Hence, the minimum wage earners will continue to be exempted from income taxes as their income falls below P250,00. Therefore, the new tax structure will address the current problem wherein going a peso above the minimum wage will effect in a lower effective take home pay, resulting to discouraging minimum wage earners to accept incremental wage increases and keeping them in an artificial minimum wage trap.

2.14.2 War on Drugs

June 2016, since becoming a president of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte has launched a war on drugs that has cause in the extrajudicial deaths of thousands of alleged users and dealers across the country. According to John Gershman ‘major obstacles to the Philippines’ economic and social progress is how Philippine president sees drug dealing and addiction. Earlier in Duterte’s political career as the mayor of the city of Davao the drug war is a cornerstone of Duterte’s domestic policy. Becoming a president in June, he encouraged the public to “go ahead kill’ drug addicts. Duterte’s language has been understood as an endorsement of extrajudicial killings, as it has resulted for people to feel that it’s appropriate to kill drug users and dealers. It followed a vigilante attacks against suspected drug addicts and dealers. The police are involved in large-scale sweeps. Moreover, the Philippine National Police also expose a list of high-level political officials and other influential people who were suspected to be involved in the drug trade.

Methamphetamine called shabu is the dominant drug in the Philippines. According to United Nations (2012) report Philippines among all the countries in the East Asia showed about 2.2 percent of Filipinos between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four were using methamphetamines. Thus, methamphetamines and marijuana were the primary drugs of choice of the Filipino. The national drug enforcement agency in 2015 reported that one fifth of the barangays, the smallest administrative division in the Philippines had evidence of drug trafficking, drug use and drug manufacturing in Manila, the capital, 92 percent of the barangays had yielded such evidence. A high level of popular support from across the spectrum in the Philippines received by the war on drugs. The presidential performance and trust ratings as most recent nationwide survey conducted from September 25 to October 1 by Pulse Asia research resulted that Duterte’s approval

rating was around 86 percent. The people support Duterte as a president for his position on other issues, even though some people are concerned about these deaths.

However, the Philippines judicial system is very slow and apparently corrupt, enabling Duterte to act practically and address the issue of drugs in a non-constructive way with widespread violations of human rights. Hence, in the face of elite dominated political system and slow, the face of a corrupt, equally corrupt and ineffective judicial system, the people are willing to tolerate this politician who promised something and is now delivering. Thus, drug addicts and dealers are defamed group and always have problems gaining political support for the defense of their right. Moreover, at most there are no trials conducted, so there is no evidence that people being killed are in the fact that they are drug addicts and dealers. In addition, these circumstances resulted the weakness of human rights institutions and discourse in the face of a popular and skilled populist leader. As a result, in December 2016, after declaring concern over Duterte's war on drugs the United States withheld poverty aid to the Philippines.

2.13 Research Hypotheses

The researcher narrowly review of the literature led to the formulation of hypotheses related to the impact of populism regime of President Duterte in the development of Philippine democracy particularly among the perspective of the netizens. Hypothesis 1. The practicing ideology of populism significantly affects the quality of democracy (political style, political communication, political strategy and performing crisis) .

Hypothesis 1.1 The political style of President Duterte significantly affects the quality of democracy.

Hypothesis 1.2 The political communication of President Duterte significantly affects the quality of democracy.

Hypothesis 1.3 The political strategy of President Duterte significantly affects the quality of democracy.

Hypothesis 1.4 The performing crisis of President Duterte significantly affects the quality of democracy.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHOD

3.1 Research Design

This research will be using mixed-method approach. A mixed method approach is a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. This involves organizing report of results in two segments, with quantitative results as first, presenting and discussing the results statistically. On the other hand, by qualitative study result are presented in terms of terms of themes and sub themes. However, there are three main components that will be analyzed for this research. First, a quantitative content analysis of the messages posted on the official Duterte Facebook account. All messages posted on these accounts except for links, shares, event announcements or images without any text will be analyzed and gathered. Second, an analysis of three examples of Duterte policies that portray a claim to populism. The analysis centered on the Presidents vocal stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policy, and the tax reform program of the government. Thus, the researcher believe that these policies have a high degree of incoherence and inconsistency in Duterte's brand of populism. Additionally, Twitter post from the netizen will be analyze and discover towards the selected policies, a tokenization, topic modelling and social network analysis using RStudio will be employed. A RStudio is an integrated development environment (IDE) for R. People around the world are using R, as an open source statistical language to make sense of data. It includes a syntax-highlighting editor that supports direct code execution, console as well as tools for history, plotting, debugging and work space management.

A social big data will be gathered using R studio and will be process using tokenization. Moreover, the gathered data will assess the agreement and disagreement comments of the netizens towards Duterte's policies. Lastly, an empirical analyzes will be utilized in order to evaluate the quality of Philippines democracy under Duterte's regime. The Freedom House will be the research preferred source of data from the start of Duterte's administration 2016 up to the present. Consequently, this research will use Wolfgang Merkel model of democracy from the root concept of embedded democracies, which consists of five interdependent partial regimes (electoral regime, political rights,

civil rights, horizontal accountability, effective power to govern), and distinguishes between four diminished sub- types of defective democracy: exclusive democracy, illiberal democracy, delegative democracy and tutelary democracy. Moreover, a comprehensive review of literature will be constantly conducted to ensure that each items and concept are fully understood and measured sufficiently.

3.2 Research Setting

This research will be conducted in the Philippines. The study of populism in the Philippines is quietly young in comparison with its Latin American and European counterparts. The Philippines in Asia is one of the oldest democracies with a long election experience and democratic institution formation. Thus, Philippines governance and politics took an exciting turn in 2017. It was the instant when the charm of the administration of new president, Rodrigo Duterte, came more alarmingly into focus. Duterte had already presumed global fame and a certain notorious since he led a successful 2016 national election campaign and appearing to break authoritatively in both foreign and domestic policy, rule with an iron fist and non-conformist public persona. Among other things, the year following his election shows a momentous development that provide significant insights into the future and current shape of the phenomenon of populism in the Philippines.

3.3 Respondents of the Study

The respondents of this study are all social media users of both Facebook and Twitter who posted information concerning about the Duterte's policies that have a high degree of incoherence and inconsistency in brand of populism. In line with that, the policies focus in Duterte's stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policies and the tax reform program of the government. Thus, all the post from social media users will be analyzed in its agreement and disagreement post.

3.4 Data Collection

Th method of big data through R studio and data from Freedom House report will be used in the herein research. Hence, Duterte's populism as manifestation in social media

the data will be extracted accordingly to Duterte's Facebook official page. Thus, the data that will be obtain from the official page are actually relevant post or messages of Duterte. Consequently, Duterte's main policies that adheres populism will limit to policies concerning to stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policies and the tax reform program of the government. In line with that, these three main policies will be evaluated based on to the netizen post in Twitter. The data will be collected from Twitter using the R studio. Repost will actually be removed in order to avoid duplication of same user post. Furthermore, this research will evaluate the quality of democracy in the Philippine under the administration of Duterte using the available data from the Freedom House report.

3.5 Data Analysis

The gathered data will be sorted and analyzed. To assess Duterte's populism as manifestation in social media the research will use a three criteria key elements of populist discourse by Jagers and Walgrave (2007) defined: 'elites', 'the people' and 'the others'. This, research will consider all the posts of Duterte's official page containing at least one references to the mentioned key elements as an expression of populism by Jagers and Walgrave (2007). Starting from the typology of Jagers and Walgrave (2007) populist discourse, combining three elements into, this research will utilize elements into four different types of messages, according to their content:

1. Complete populism statements containing references to all the three key elements;
2. Empty populism statements containing only "the people" as reference;
3. Excluding populism statements containing references to 'the others' and post containing 'the people' and 'the others' as reference;
4. Anti-elitist populism statements containing 'the elites' and statements containing 'the people' and 'the elites'

Moreover, an analysis centered on the Presidents vocal stand against the oligarch, the war on drugs policies and the tax reform program of the government will be evaluated based on the positive and negative comments of the netizen in Twitter. The data from R studio will go through tokenization collect relevant words that shall result in pieces of information. Tokenization is a process of breaking a text string up into phrases, words,

symbols, or other meaning elements called tokens. Thus, this can be done by returning the sequence of tokens or the corresponding spans. This can be referred as “token tokenizers” and “span tokenizers”.

After which the data will also be filtered through topic modeling. A topic modelling provides an algorithmic solution to managing, organizing and annotating large archival text. It provides a simple way to analyze large volumes of unlabeled text. Thus “topic” consists of a cluster of words that frequently occur together. Moreover, the gathered post of the netizen containing messaged with regards to Duterte’s policies will undergo a social network analysis. According to Luke (2015) social network analysis is a set of methods used to visualized networks, describe specific characteristic of overall network structure and build a mathematical and statistical model of dynamics and network structures. Furthermore, the data from the Freedom House report will be evaluated through the roots of Wolfgang Merkel embedded and defective democracies in order to analyze the development of Philippine democracy under Duterte’s regime.

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